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Abstract This study compares the dominant 
narratives on the future of work. It shows that 
a paradigm shift is underway in the context of 
scenario analysis, as a consequence of the rapid 
development of robotic and computer 
technologies. In addition to the two main 
traditions of thought, which respectively 
emphasize ‘technological unemployment’ and 
‘compensation,’ a third vision of the future is 
emerging that examines trends and scenarios 
ignored by traditional economic theories. This 
third narrative emphasizes the phenomenon of 
‘hollowing out,’ which states that automation 
will not cause the complete disappearance of 
work, but only that requiring average 
qualifications. In other words, in the absence of 
corrective interventions, the society of the 
future will be characterized by the presence of 
a minority of privileged citizens, who will be 
able to fully enjoy the fruits of automation, 
surrounded by a majority of citizens engaged in 
precarious and degrading jobs. This study also 
shows that the third narrative is only relatively 
new: Socio-technical expectations have come 
full circle, reviving a prognosis already present 
in Karl Marx’s works. 
Keywords: Socio-technical Expectations, 
Automation, Technological Unemployment, 
Compensation Theories, Hollowing Out 
Resumen: Este estudio compara las narrativas 
dominantes sobre el futuro del trabajo. Pone de 
relieve que se está produciendo un cambio de 
paradigma en el contexto del análisis de 
escenarios, como consecuencia del rápido 
desarrollo de las tecnologías relacionadas con la 
robótica e informática. Además de las dos 
tradiciones principales de pensamiento, que 
enfatizan respectivamente el "desempleo 
tecnológico" y la "compensación", está surgiendo 
una tercera visión de futuro que examina 
tendencias y escenarios ignorados por las teorías 
económicas tradicionales. Esta tercera narrativa 
enfatiza el fenómeno de "vaciado", que establece 
que la automatización no causará la desaparición 
completa del trabajo, tan sólo requerirá de unas 
cualificaciones medias. En otras palabras, ante la 
ausencia de intervenciones correctivas, la 
sociedad del futuro se caracterizará por la 
presencia de una minoría de ciudadanos 
privilegiados, quienes podrán disfrutar 
plenamente de los frutos de la automatización, 
rodeados por una mayoría de ciudadanos que 
participan en actividades precarias. y trabajos 
degradantes. Este estudio también muestra que 
la tercera narrativa es solo relativamente nueva: 
las expectativas socio-técnicas han dado un giro 
completo, reviviendo un pronóstico ya presente 
en las obras de Karl Marx. 
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Two economic theories, two scenarios 
 
Whenever new machines capable of economizing the use of labor have been 
introduced into the productive fabric, a significant number of workers have lost 
their jobs. Some of these workers have remained permanently unemployed, 
others have fallen into the limbo of precarious work, others have found a lower 
paying or less rewarding job, and others have been retrained and found a better 
job. Overall, after each critical phase, the economy has always found its 
equilibrium, albeit on an altered basis. Nobody disputes the occurance of this 
process, although the reconstructions and evaluations, or – to use a sociological 
term – the ‘narratives’ of the process diverge. Here we will examine narratives of 
the past, the present, and the future of work, in the perspective of the “sociology 
of socio-technical expectations” (Brown & Michael, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; 
Arnaldi, 2010, pp. 53-82). 
Although the diagnoses, prognoses, and therapies proposed by scholars in 
the last two centuries are different, the various theoretical perspectives can be 
grouped into two main schools of thought. On the one hand are those who 
emphasize the role of automation and, in particular, its propensity to produce 
technological unemployment. The basic idea is that technological 
transformations impact the entire complex of production, distribution, and 
consumption, with ambivalent results, making the corrective and regulatory 
intervention of the government necessary. After the famous revolt of the 
Luddites, which took place at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the role of 
automation and its undesired effects has been emphasized by economists such as 
David Ricardo (1821) and John Maynard Keynes (1963, pp. 358-373). 
On the other hand are those who minimize or even deny the problem of 
technological unemployment, by stating that unemployment, when it is not 
voluntary, is cyclical, frictional, temporary, or due to other causes. Furthermore, 
even if the phenomenon were really the effect of technological development, new 
jobs regularly emerge to replace those that have disappeared. Therefore, from the 
technological transformations of the productive complex one should not expect 
significant changes in the economic system, nor should one think that the 
intervention of the government is necessary in order to fix the problems. The 
mechanisms of the market will compensate for the undesired effects of 
automation. This school of thought can be traced to economists belonging to 
several different historical periods, such as Adam Smith (1776) and Knut 
Wicksell (1977). 
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The economists of the first type are mostly Marxists and Keynesians, with 
the exception of Ricardo, who throws the cat among the pigeons when he is still 
one of the main exponents of classical political economy who, along with the 
neoclassical (marginalist) school, are usually economists of the second type. 
Since the two factions are joined not only by economists, but also by 
sociologists, political scientists, engineers, futurologists, and politicians, we need 
to use labels able to transcend the disciplines; we opt for ‘emphasizers’ and 
‘minimizers’ – terms that flexibly represent the two viewpoints highlighted 
above. 
Economic historians already count three industrial revolutions and are now 
starting a discussion about the idea that humanity is at the dawn of a fourth 
(Schwab 2017). The first industrial revolution, begun in England in the 18th 
century, saw the introduction in the factories of the steam engine and mechanical 
looms. The second industrial revolution, in some countries also called ‘take-off,’ 
occurred between the nineteenth and twentieth century and is characterized by 
the appearance of the internal combustion engine and electricity. The third, which 
took place in the second half of the twentieth century, saw the introduction of 
computers and robots into the factories (Campa, 2017 d, pp. 53-78). 
Each of these waves in the real world caused a corresponding ‘jolt’ in the 
world of ideas. As one can imagine, in the periods of economic crises the 
narration of the emphasizers appeared to be more convincing, while in the periods 
of economic expansion the narration of the minimizers was regularly back in 
vogue (Woirol, 1996). We can therefore agree that both narratives capture 
elements of truth and at the same time display some limits. History has shown 
that the emphasizers have tended to overestimate the disruptive character of 
technological innovations in relation to the tightness of the system. As a matter 
of fact, downstream of three industrial revolutions, we are still in a capitalist 
system and the constant growth of productivity has not led to the complete 
disappearance of wage labor, nor structural mass unemployment. On the other 
hand, the minimizers tend to overlook the fact that the irreversible crisis of the 
system has been avoided not only thanks to the compensation mentioned in their 
theories, but also thanks to continuous government interventions. The so-called 
‘compensation theories’ have a limited applicability, because in the course of the 
20th century laissez-faire capitalism has rarely been seen in action. 
Nationalizations and socializations have not only characterized the economic 
policy of non-capitalist regimes (fascist and communist regimes, to make it 
clear), but also democratic-liberal ones. The economy has been constantly driven 
by industrial policies, while workers have been supported by social policies, such 
as the reduction of working time, the right to quit, unemployment benefits, 
sickness insurance, paid maternity leave, pensions, etc. These policies forced 
entrepreneurs to hire more workers than they would have in a laissez-faire regime. 
Furthermore, a large portion of unemployed people were reabsorbed into the 
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public sector or into private companies that have contracts only with the 
government. 
The combination of false alarms by the emphasizers and the self-reassuring 
narrative by the minimizers, at the turn of the 21st century, led to the belief that 
politics should deal with anything but the economy, leaving the task of 
reallocating the resources to the market mechanisms. There are, however, three 
new elements that invite us to seriously reconsider the disruptive dimension of 
technological change: 1) the quality of new technologies; 2) the discovery of the 
hollowing out phenomenon; 3) the fact that, since the 1980s, the neoliberal 
paradigm has succeeded in reshaping the productive structure of most countries, 
putting back on stage a laissez-faire capitalism that previously existed only in 
economic theory. 
 
The quality of new technologies 
 
In recent years, a growing number of observers have begun to emphasize the 
impact of new technologies on employment. Everything suggests that we are 
facing a paradigm shift in the field of socio-technical expectations. 
A first warning was sounded in 2011 by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee, both researchers of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In the 
book Race against the machine, the two scholars try to shed light on one aspect 
of the economic crisis that mainstream economists have mostly ignored. By 
analyzing the exceptional economic growth following the great recession of 
2008, the authors realize that the vigorous intervention of the American 
government has led to immediate improvements in various indicators of 
economic health. GDP has increased, company profits have increased, and 
investments have rapidly rebounded upwards, especially in the field of equipment 
and software. Nevertheless, the employment rate did not recover at a similar rate. 
This observation prompted Brynjolfsson and McAfee to conclude that a drastic 
change in the production system is under way. In other words, the financial crisis 
and other political crises have so far prevented us from seeing that we are in the 
middle of a technological revolution. New technologies are radically changing 
the concept of work, the way in which value is created, and above all the way in 
which the economy distributes the created value. 
The call to shift attention to technological innovation did not fall into the 
void. Two years later, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) published a report 
entitled Disruptive Technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and 
the global economy (Manyika et al., 2013) that directly addresses policy makers. 
The authors  stress that entrepreneurs and politicians should base their decisions 
on scenario analyses that consider the future impact of technology on society at 
large. It is no longer possible to talk seriously about politics, even in the short 
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term, without discussing the impact of innovations such as mobile connections, 
the automation of cognitive work, the Internet of things, Cloud technology, 
advanced robotics, autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles, new generation 
genomics, energy storage techniques, 3D printers, innovative materials such as 
nano-materials and nano-structures, and innovations in gas and oil extraction and 
renewable energy production. 
The MGI invites the economic and political elites to get a clear 
understanding of how technology is reshaping the global economy and society, 
as well as how it will change it in the next decade, in order to address the risks 
and opportunities offered by this development. In particular, world leaders “will 
need to decide how to invest in new forms of education and infrastructure, and 
figure out how disruptive economic change will affect comparative advantages” 
(ibid., p. 1). The McKinsey researchers present a generally optimistic 
scenario,showing that the technologies in their list “have great potential to 
improve the lives of billions of people” (ibid., p. 18). They quantify a potential 
economic impact of new technologies on the order of between 14 and 33 trillion 
dollars a year, starting in 2025. However, as we have already noted in another 
article (Campa, 2017 a), the trend is mainly aimed at meeting the expectations of 
large multinational corporations. 
The report admits that this future trend may also have negative side effects 
for other social classes. The benefits of the technologies may not be equally 
distributed. Technical progress could help to widen inequalities, because the 
automation of cognitive work and advanced robotics will lead to the replacement 
of low-skilled workers with machines and software programs, offering 
opportunities for gains above all to capitalists and high-skilled workers. This 
admission does not, however, affect the positive picture of the future elaborated 
by McKinsey analysts, according to whom unwanted side effects can be removed 
with the same remedies adopted in the past: an increase in work flexibility and 
technical-scientific education. In this sense, despite the great emphasis on 
innovation, the image of the future produced by 2013 McKinsey report is still 
rather ‘conservative.’ Firstly, the analysts still trust the classical theory of 
compensation: any job lost because of machines will reappear in the machine-
building sector, or in less automated sectors if the labor market is sufficiently 
flexible. Secondly, they are convinced that “over the long term and on an 
economy-wide basis, productivity growth and job creation can continue to grow 
in tandem, as they generally have historically, if business leaders and policy 
makers can provide the necessary levels of innovation and education” (ibid., p. 
27).  
In a nutshell, they do not deny the disruptive nature of new technologies, 
nor the need for government intervention. In this respect, there is a novelty 
compared to the neoliberal paradigm. However, they seem to limit public policies 
to the field of education, to better qualify young people and retrain those who lose 
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their jobs. According to the report, to avoid the specter of mass unemployment, 
it will be enough to induce citizens to study more mathematics, science, and 
engineering, and stay away from the humanities. 
However, not everyone shares this optimism. Also in 2013, two researchers 
from the University of Oxford, Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, 
published a report on the transformations of work that over the next five years, 
would collect more than a thousand citations in the scientific literature. The report 
is basically an attempt to quantify the risk of job automation in the United States 
over the next two decades. The methodology adopted by the authors, then 
extended to the study of other countries, assigns a probability of automation to 
each type of job, and distinguished three bands: those with a probability of 
automation lower than 33% (Low), those with a range of probability between 33 
and 66% (Medium) and those with a probability higher than 66% (High) . It 
claims, for example, that scientists are in the Low band, with a 15% probability 
of being replaced by a robot, while accountants are in the High band at 95%. 
As for the United States, given the employment distribution of that country, 
it found that 33% of the jobs have a low risk of automation, 10% a medium risk, 
and as much as 47% have a high risk. If half of the working population will 
actually remain unemployed, we can expect a considerable backlash on the entire 
economic and social structure. 
After the publishing success of Race Against the Machine, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee returned to the topic of automation in 2014, with a new book titled 
The Second Machine Age. Here, they introduce a concept – the one indicated by 
the title itself – that went on to be widely used in specialized literature. Since the 
narration of the minimizers is based on the idea that machines are complementary 
and not substitutive of human work, the authors respond to this persistent 
criticism by underlining that we are now in an unprecedented situation. Contrary 
to what happened during the ‘First Machine Age,’ corresponding to the early 
stages of the industrial revolution, the ‘Second Machine Age’ involves the 
automation of many cognitive tasks, not just manual ones. This means that new 
software programs and pieces of hardware are now able to replace human brains, 
not simply help fatigued workers. The authors emphasize that the pace of 
automation now grows due to the combined adoption of many emerging 
technologies, including: advanced robotics, numerical control machines, 
management software, (voice, speaker, and pattern) recognition systems, 
machine translation, self-driving vehicles, and online commerce. Innovation in a 
field is then applied to other fields, accelerating the entire automation process. 
In 2015, Martin Ford published a monograph titled Rise of the Robots, 
which even predicts a jobless future. The book immediately captured the attention 
of the readers, conquering the summit of the New York Times Best Seller, and 
won prestigious awards such as the Financial Times and McKinsey Business 
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Book of the Year Award. Ford also insists that 20th century technological advances 
have mostly marginalized untrained workers, while 21st century innovations are 
increasingly threatening the jobs of skilled workers. 
Many jobs have already evaporated, but the new sectors of the economy 
are not generating enough jobs to reabsorb workers expelled from the productive 
fabric. For example, companies that operate almost exclusively on the Internet 
(YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, PayPal, Google, Amazon, etc.) use a minimal 
portion of workforce, while generating very high revenues. If this trend continues, 
the companies of the future will not be labor intensive. In addition, the 
phenomena of offshoring and outsourcing, which derive from globalization and 
are themselves favored by new technologies, must be taken into account. An array 
of professional positions (accountants, personnel managers, lawyers, radiologists, 
software designers, etc.) have already been outsourced from Europe and America. 
Their tasks have been transferred to lower-paid workers in developing countries, 
by taking advantage of the fact that they have become simple to perform. With 
only a couple of weeks of corporate training or tutoring, an apprentice is able to 
learn a job that previously required a master’s degree. Typically, the new 
employee has to learn how to enter data into a piece of software which will do 
the rest. Interestingly, Ford is a futurist, not an economist. Neoclassical 
economists tend to remain loyal to their theory and insist that even today’s 
unemployment is frictional, or due to causes other than technological 
development (Autor 2015). 
The year 2015 marked a milestone also for the World Economic Forum. 
Among the analysts invited to Davos there has always been attention to structural 
unemployment as a possible risk for the economy. However, in previous reports, 
the risk of unemployment was related to causes other than automation, such as 
the inadequate education of the new generations, or the repercussions of the 
global financial crisis that broke out in 2008. In The Global Risk Report 2014, for 
example, we find a mention of a so-called ‘lost generation,’ in the following 
terms: “The generation coming of age in the 2010s faces high unemployment and 
precarious job situations, hampering their efforts to build a future and raising the 
risk of social unrest” (WEF, 2014, p. 10). This lost generation will not find work 
because of inadequate preparation: “In advanced economies, the large number of 
graduates from expensive and outmoded educational systems – graduating with 
high debts and mismatched skills – points to a need to adapt and integrate 
professional and academic education” (ibid.). Problems arising from new 
technologies were seen as limited to the sphere of cyberattacks. The digital 
society generates insecurity and mistrust in relation to communication processes 
and, therefore, policy makers are invited to preserve, protect and govern that 
common good that is cyberspace. 
A year later, in The Global Risk Report 2015, comes the first change in 
tone. Unemployment is no longer referred only to the financial crisis or to the 
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inadequacy of the educational system, but also to the direct impact of new 
technologies. Robotization and digitization are not yet seen as primary causes of 
unemployment, but as contributing factors to keeping it high: “Rising structural 
unemployment drives both inequality and social pressures. Lower economic 
growth and technological change are likely to keep unemployment high in the 
future, also in developing countries” (WEF, 2015, p. 15). 
In The Global Risk Report 2016, we read that “rapid advances in 
technologies are coupled with ever-growing cyber fragilities and persistent 
unemployment and underemployment” (WEF, 2016 a, p. 8). Again, a direct 
causal connection is not stated, but a strong correlation between the two 
phenomena is at least highlighted. In the same report, the authors insist on the 
fact that we have entered the fourth industrial revolution, a concept that is 
identified with that of ‘sweeping digitalization.’ Indeed, the document underlines 
that “implications of sweeping digitization (also termed the ‘Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’), ranging from transformations that are the result of rising cyber 
connectivity to the potential effects of innovations on socio- economic equality 
and global security, remain far from fully understood” (WEF, 2017, p. 47). Klaus 
Schwab, the founder and principal animator of the World Economic Forum, who 
is an engineer as well as an economist, is the one who promotes the use of this 
interpretative category. Renewing vocabulary is, of course, a way to highlight 
that contemporary society is in an unprecedented situation. 
In 2016, the Forum also published a report entirely dedicated to the future 
of work, where the concept of the fourth industrial revolution is expanded. The 
incipit of the document reads as follows: “Today, we are at the beginning of a 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. Developments in genetics, artificial intelligence, 
robotics, nanotechnology, 3D printing and biotechnology, to name just a few, are 
all building on and amplifying one another. This will lay the foundation for a 
revolution more comprehensive and all-encompassing than anything we have 
ever seen” (WEF, 2016 b, p. v). 
In The Global Risk Report 2017 is a small section entitled The Disruptive 
Impact of Emerging Technologies, in which the direct relationship between 
automation and unemployment is eventually stated. It notes that “one obvious 
channel through which technological change can lead to wider disruption is the 
labour market, with incomes pushed down and unemployment pushed up in 
affected sectors and geographical regions. This in turn can lead to disruptive 
social instability, in line with the GRPS finding this year that the most important 
interconnection of global risks is the pairing of unemployment and social 
instability” (WEF, 2017, p. 46). As one can see, now the negative side effects of 
digitization and automation have become ‘obvious.’ New technologies are 
definitively pushing wages down and increasing unemployment. 
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Finally, The Global Risk Report 2018 explicitly envisages a future of 
technological unemployment: “For the foreseeable future, automation and 
digitalization can be expected to push down on levels of employment and wages, 
and contribute to increases in income and wealth at the top of the distribution.” 
Besides, it stresses the social along with the economic dimension of the risk, since 
“norms relating to work are an important part of the implicit contract that holds 
societies together” (WEF, 2018, p. 9). 
 
Long-term trends and a third scenario 
 
With regard to long-term trends, a particularly important point was made by the 
Bank of England’s chief economist, Andrew Haldane, at the Trades Union 
Congress in November 2015. Haldane, who had been included by Time Magazine 
in its list of the 100 most influential people in the world, presented a rich set of 
statistics to back up  ideas that have previously been elaborated by other 
researchers (e.g. Davidson, 2013), and also managed to condense into a few pages 
an overview of industrial capitalism that covers three centuries. The speech 
deserves to be scrutinized in detail, because it comes from the heart of the City, 
to say one of the pulsating centers of world capitalism, but it reaches conclusions 
that seem to support theses traditionally supported by the critics of capitalism. 
We have seen that since the beginning of the industrial revolution there 
have been three disruptive waves of technological innovation, each characterized 
by a first phase of discomfort for the working class and a second phase of 
resettlement. When new technologies have invaded farms, factories, and offices, 
unemployment in effected sectors has grown, but then the workforce has been 
invariably reabsorbed in other productive sectors. Nonetheless, this is only what 
is seen on the surface. The trend is not simply cyclical, Haldane concluded. On a 
deeper level, one can observe two long lasting trends that underlie these 
transformative phases, one of them positive and the other negative 
The good news is that, since the beginning of the industrial revolution to 
the dawn of the 21st century, the real wages of workers have constantly grown. 
The bad news is a parallel ‘hollowing out’ of the middle class – a process which 
is not only persistent but also increasing. A study by Lawrence Katz and Robert 
Margo (2013) showed that between 1850 and 1910, the share of skilled workers 
in the US manufacturing sector grew from about 3% to 12%. In the same period, 
the share of low skilled jobs also increased, going from 58% to about 65%. In 
contrast, the percentage of workers with average qualifications decreased from 
40% to 23%. This is what we mean by ‘hollowing out’: the occupation pattern 
takes a U shape. In simple terms, the production and use of industrial machines 
have generated job opportunities for managers and engineers on the one hand, 
and for workers without qualifications on the other hand, while the percentage of 
craftsmen – to say the middle class – has significantly shrunk. 
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In subsequent phases, the U-shaped curve that represents the disappearing 
of the middle class becomes even more pronounced. Haldane notes that “moving 
into the 20th century, and the third industrial revolution, these emerging patterns 
in jobs and wages have become clearer. Technology appears to be resulting in 
faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in the past. Why? Because 
20th century machines have substituted not just for manual human tasks, but 
cognitive ones too” (Haldane 2015, p. 14). 
The graphs of almost all the industrialized countries, adds the Chief 
Economist of the Bank of England, “tell a striking and consistent story of mid-
skill jobs being lost, counterbalanced by employment gains at the high-skill and, 
to lesser extent, low-skill segments of the workforce. The U-shape, or ‘hollowing 
out,’ has deepened and widened” (ibid.). 
Workers who have average qualifications cannot aspire to better paid jobs, 
but on the other hand they are over-qualified for the less-skilled tasks, so they fall 
into the limbo of ‘underemployment.’ In other words, if it is true that not all jobs 
have disappeared as a result of automation, it is also true that, in the long run, the 
bifurcation between the elite and the rest of the population is increasing 
continuously and inexorably. 
Haldane also points out that the model based on waves of temporary 
unemployment and reabsorption, accompanied by the gradual evaporation of the 
middle class, a substantial holding of employment and an overall increase in 
wealth, may not apply to the next wave, that is: the fourth industrial revolution, 
or second machine age, as one prefers. The English economist says that “this time 
could be different. There is evidence, across a number of countries, of the labour 
share having fallen over recent decades. […] A number of explanations have been 
proposed for these falling labour shares, including the falling relative cost of 
capital goods and globalisation. A third explanation, related to the first two, is 
technological change” (ibid., p. 15). The presence of the machine, regardless if 
complementary to or substitute for human work, or whether suitable for physical 
work or cognitive tasks, has in general resulted in a weakening of the bargaining 
power of labor towards capital. In summary, the third phase of the industrial 
revolution has provoked an intensification of trends already visible in the first 
two phases and, in particular, of the hollowing out of the middle class and of the 
decrease of the share of income from work in comparison with the share of 
income from capital. Pessimism concerning the fourth phase is a consequence of 
the awareness of this trend. 
Meanwhile, the other long-term trend, the good one, namely the growth of 
real wages, has suddenly stopped. Sally Hills and Ryland Thomas, also 
economists from the Bank of England, and Nicholas Dimsdale, from Queen’s 
College, Oxford, have analyzed the macroeconomic data of the UK over the past 
three centuries. From 1750 to today, an average productivity growth of 1.1% per 
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year has been recorded, together with a real wage growth that follows the same 
upward trend and is equal to 0.9% per annum. So, in the long term, there was no 
real conflict between machines and humans. However, at the dawn of the 21st 
century, this trend has come to a halt. This has been confirmed first by a report 
drawn up two years after the 2008 crisis and a second update that appeared five 
years later (Hills et al., 2015). 
Several arguments have been proposed to explain this situation. As often 
happens in the social and economic realm, the causes of a phenomenon could be 
multiple, concomitant, and non-mutually exclusive, and they could also be 
different in each country. Much has been written about the effects of the global 
recession of the two-year period 2008-2009, which naturally remains the first 
suspect. After the crisis, real wages have not returned to their previous level, even 
in countries that have started growing again, such as the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom. As for the countries of the Eurozone, several scholars 
have pointed the finger at the austerity policies of the European Union (Cruces et 
al., 2015). However, the stagnation or inadequate growth of nominal wages has 
also been observed in countries such as Germany, which unlike other European 
countries benefited greatly from the adoption of the euro, especially with regard 
to the trade balance and the employment rate. The German case is particularly 
significant, because – in general – when there are very low levels of 
unemployment (and in Germany they are at an all-time low since the time of 
unification) wages tend to grow due to the law of supply and demand. In spite of 
the fact that there is a demand for skilled work, wages have not grown, however. 
For this unusual phenomenon, the governor of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, 
has blamed immigration. Thus, the Marxian concept of a ‘reserve army of labour’ 
is implicitly revived. These are Weidmann’s words: “Bundesbank research 
suggests that migration from other EU member states partially accounts for 
dampened wage pressures in Germany” (Jones, 2018). More generally, the effects 
of globalization, namely the free movement of people, goods, service, and 
capitals, are called into question. Wage reduction has often been indicated as the 
only recipe that can make an economy competitive in a global context where 
goods are imported from countries where workers perceive low wages and enjoy 
few protections, or where workers with lower salary demands can be easily 
‘imported.’ 
According to Haldane, however, the problem is not generated solely by the 
financial crisis or the globalization of the markets. He, like the many of the other 
observers we have mentioned above, includes among the possible causes of the 
decline in wagesthe quality of 21st century technologies, which make human work 
uncompetitive. While he tries to maintain an optimistic tone, his forecasts are not 
reassuring for those who need a job to survive. In the next years, “technology may 
be set to change jobs and wages more fundamentally than in the past. Job 
displacement and creation may come thicker and faster than ever previously. 
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‘Hollowing out’ may become more pervasive. And gaps between those with and 
without skills, or with and without jobs, may widen as never before” (Haldane, 
2015, p. 3). 
But there is more. Haldane also takes into consideration the hypothesis of 
the technological Singularity, that is, an overtaking of human intelligence by 
artificial intelligence, which would make humans completely obsolete (ibid., p. 
19). Ray Kurzweil, a director of engineering at Google, in his futuristic 
projections, sets for 2029 the time of the overtaking of human brain computation 
power by machines, and for 2045 the advent of the Singularity, which should also 
involve [self] awareness by the machines (Kurzweil, 2005). It is clear that if such 
a scenario were to happen, it would not make much sense to talk about 
technological unemployment. The behavior of conscious machines would 
become unpredictable, but one can hardly count on the fact that artificial beings 
more intelligent than humans would place themselves at our service. 
Haldane’s conclusion is the ultimate sign that we are facing a paradigm 
shift in scenario analysis. After saying that, as regards the past, Mill was right and 
Ricardo wrong, looking at the current situation, he concedes that “maybe Ricardo 
and the Luddites had a point after all, albeit two hundred years too early” 
(Haldane, 2015, p. 20). With this admission, the expectations about the future of 
work has come full circle. 
Even if the Bank of England chief economist does not go as far, perhaps 
we should admit that the most forward thinker on these issues was actually Karl 
Marx. If not from the point of view of therapy, at least from the point of view of 
diagnosis and prognosis, his narrative can be seen as precursory to the new trend 
in socio-technical expectations. Not only did the author of Capital stress the 
centrality, for economic and sociological analysis, of concepts such as automation 
and technological unemployment (Campa, 2017 b, 2017 c), but he also 
anticipated the hollowing out phenomenon. In other words, he clearly stated that 
the machine, managed capitalistically, would lead to the gradual disappearance 
of the middle class. When Marx and Engels (1948, p. 9) warned that “our epoch, 
the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has 
simplified class antagonisms,” and that “society as a whole is more and more 
splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing 
each other – bourgeoisie and proletariat,” were they not saying that the 
enrichment of the upper class (haute bourgeoisie) and the proletarianization of 
the middle class (petite bourgeoisie) was taking place? In other words, were they 
not saying that a remodeling of the distribution of wealth according to the U-
shaped curve of hollowing out was under way? 
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To conclude, we will shift from narrative analysis to social analysis. Assuming 
that the new trend in socio-technical expectations is closer to ‘reality’ than the 
previous two, one may ask why this third scenario is now gaining acceptance 
among analysts. We sketch a tentative explanation. A narrative may become 
hegemonic even if it is totally disconnected from reality. However, sometimes, a 
phenomenon, or a process, becomes so pervasive that no narrative can ignore its 
social effects. We surmise that the hollowing out phenomenon has become fully 
visible only now simply because only now do we have before us ‘real capitalism’ 
– that is to say: a laissez-faire economy. Capitalism began to show its face in the 
19th century, but later, after the emergence of the communist regimes, after the 
great recession of 1929, and above all with the onset of the Cold War, Western 
societies turned into welfare state systems. To win the challenge against 
communism, capitalism decided to show a human face, emancipating the working 
class to a certain extent and slowing down the erosion of the middle class. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, this necessity disappeared and a process already visible 
in its embryonic stage in the 19th century, and still present at the underground 
level in the 20th century, like a karst river, has reemerged at the dawn of the 21st 
century. 
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